Research
Programs
Globalization has been one of
the most studied phenomena since the 1990s. Globalization implies a
change in the scale of politics and economics, transcending national
boundaries and thereby constraining states from achieving their
objectives independently. As a structural force, globalization
compels functional adaptation to a vast array of new
interdependencies that touch on all aspects of politics and social
life. In so doing, however, it prompts a variety of local adaptive
strategies with complexities that have yet to be fully understood.
Furthermore, globalization introduces a range of new security
concerns, such as transnational terrorism, the spread of global
pandemics, and large-scale population movements, that states are
ill-equipped to combat on their own. We define globalization
as a vast, multi-faceted enterprise that proceeds both outside
the state and within it, spurred on by businesses, consumers, social
groups, states, and international institutions as they organize the
economic, political, and cultural spheres beyond the nation-state
(Ripsman and Paul, 2010). Thus, for us, globalization entails: the
widespread operation of businesses on a global, rather than a
national level; the ease with which individuals and groups can
communicate and organize across national frontiers; the global
transmission of ideas, norms, and values that might erode national
cultures in favor of a broader global culture; the increasing
participation of states in international political, economic, and
military organizations; the spread of particular forms of political
institutions, such as representative democracy to vast areas of the
globe; and the increasing participation of individuals from multiple
countries in international non-governmental organizations.
This phenomenon of globalization,
crucially, also involves a reshuffling of the deck of the world
order. Owing to uneven economic growth, normative shifts, and
contrasting political developments, this early 21st
century is marked by profound changes in the global distribution of
power as well as in global governance practices. This transition
pattern is likely to accelerate in the coming few decades and it is
fundamental for both policy and research to better grasp the effects
of the new dynamics unleashed by increasing globalization on
shifting world orders. The question addressed by the team is all the
more pressing in that historically, such changes in the global
distribution of power have been accompanied by large-scale violence
and war. And yet, we start from the assumption that peaceful
alternatives are not only imaginable but also rooted in existing
politics and practices.
The last decade has shown with much
clarity that countries such as China, India, Brazil, South Africa,
and even Turkey and Indonesia are now key economic players on the
world stage. The creation of the Group of 20 and BRICS (Brazil,
Russia, India, China, South Africa) attests to how the international
architecture has started to adapt to the rise of new economic
powerhouses. However, in the security realm, transition and
adaptation has yet to take place. In the next twenty years or so,
the rising powers will likely become political and military
heavyweights and will claim corresponding status, recognition, and
influence. Should these claims not be properly accommodated, the
risk of conflict and even violence could quickly increase.
The Problematique:
Historically, wars, especially hegemonic wars, have been the
main agents of structural change and status determination in the
international system. Not surprisingly, dominant International
Relations (IR) theories contend that major changes in the system are
generally possible only through violent conflict. For example, power
transition theories argue that war is the principal agent through
which systemic changes occur in international politics (Gilpin,
1981; Organski and Kugler, 1980), whereas Marxist and class-based
theories have placed enormous importance on imperial struggles as
the cause for system-wide changes (Hobson, 1902; Lenin, 1939;
Schumpeter, 1955). Similarly, long cycle and world system theorists
also believe in the inevitability of war for major changes
(Modelski, 1987; Wallerstein, 1974). This research project poses
the question of whether, despite this track record, peaceful
accommodation of rising powers is possible in the globalized
international context. Our preliminary hypothesis is that while
globalization has indeed tempered the prospects for major war as a
system changing mechanism, active strategies by states and
international institutions are necessary to achieve peaceful power
transitions. We begin by discussing dominant current war avoidance
strategies, and their challenges.
War Avoidance Strategies:
Realist prescriptions for war avoidance are often
based on three strategies: balance of power, containment, and
deterrence. These coercive strategies assume that a threatening
state can be dissuaded from starting a war if the costs of war are
made higher than the expected benefits. When balance of power
exists, systemic stability is maintained as no single actor will
become too powerful to engage in aggressive behavior and thereby,
system-changing wars. The containment strategy is predicated on the
assumption that a challenger can be contained through different
mechanisms, including economic and political deprivation and
military denial (Kennan, 1947; Gaddis, 1982). The logic of
deterrence is that a challenging state can be prevented from
initiating war if the cost of an attack is made higher than the
benefits, through a threat of a punishing retaliatory attack
(Schelling, 1980; Snyder, 1961). Regardless of the merits of these
mechanisms, however, the single-minded pursuit of balance of power
and deterrence is not likely to bring peaceful change in an era of
globalization. Not only might implementation of these strategies be
viewed as highly threatening by some challengers, forcing them to
engage in protracted regional conflicts, arms races, or preventive
warfare, but crucially, these strategies are problematic because
they are aimed at keeping the status quo intact and not to adjust
the aspirations of rising powers peacefully.
The contending paradigm to realism,
liberal-institutionalism, treats peaceful
change more effectively, especially in the globalized era. Various
perspectives under this school locate the sources of peaceful change
in international institutions and regimes, interdependence among
major actors, democratization, and the creation of a liberal
international economic order (Keohane and Nye, 1989; Rosecrance,
1986, Russett, 1993). However, the larger context of strategies that
are and should be adopted by the leading actors in dealing with
change is often given less prominence in these theories.
Grand Strategies of Peaceful Change:
The most critical factor in determining whether peaceful change is
likely to occur is whether status quo powers pursue a strategy of
gradual integration prior to, and at each stage of, a structural
conflict and whether they succeed in it. Variations in this strategy
can be elaborated. Ideational Integration:
When the status quo powers provide an ideational and normative
framework which is more attractive than what the revisionist state
offers. Economic Integration: When
potential challengers are co-opted into the economic system of the
status quo states. Institutional Integration:
When challengers and potential challengers are co-opted through
international institutions and the norms and principles inherent in
them. Integration would mean effective participation of emerging
major states in system-wide decisions, thereby providing them with
some systemic leadership role, and how status quo states distribute
economic and political benefits among their allies and adversaries
therefore matters.
The strategy of the rising powers also
matters in this process, particularly whether they want to pursue a
peaceful rise strategy or accelerate the search for leadership role
through a strategy of war and conquest. Globalization and
nationalism in the smaller powers have made the pursuit of outright
imperial strategy on the part of new powers unlikely. The advent of
intensified globalization has therefore already influenced the
strategies of status quo powers and emerging powers, and our project
seeks to understand how this has occurred. It particularly addresses
the importance in this process of increased economic interdependence
generated by deepened globalization, as well as growing
institutionalization and normative changes at the global level. Most
critically from our perspective, while the economic fortunes of
countries are rapidly changing without attendant changes in their
power status, unlike in the past when this led to conflict, today
countries like China are reluctant to frontally challenge the order
and are pursuing other strategies such as soft balancing, hedging
and engagement. Is this due the forces generated by intensified
globalization? Our preliminary argument is that it may well be the
case.
Questions, Axes, Projects and
Goals: Notwithstanding the peaceful potential of
globalization, especially in terms of interdependence, there are
also likely to be increasing challenges to cooperation posed by, for
instance, rising levels of nationalism (including ethnic
nationalism) among the rising and declining powers. In order to
address such risks, we argue that concrete political mechanisms,
from new diplomacy through institutions to power balancing, have to
be worked out in theory, and then in practice, if the rise of new
world powers is to produce a peaceful order in the future. Our
larger goal, therefore, is to assess how different components of
globalization are shaping the behavior of rising and declining
powers, and how such tendencies can be shaped towards more positive
directions. In other words, this team seeks to establish the scope
conditions for a peaceful transition into a new world security order
prompted by the emergence of a set of rising powers. Below we raise
some of these questions, and chart out how the team seeks to address
them:
--What are the aspirations of
rising powers? We will perform comparative case studies of the
foreign policies of countries such as Brazil, China, India, Russia
and South Africa in order to understand the roles that they want to
play on the global scale. We will also look into the implications
for American and other Western countries’ foreign policies and their
response strategies.
--How do regional dynamics
intersect with world order transformation? We will study the
ways in which rising powers are vying for regional leadership on the
way to global recognition and status and the particular challenges
to peace that local dynamics pose. The reaction of declining powers,
such as in Europe, Japan and the US, will be key to answering this
question.
--What particular dimensions of
global order and its governance are being challenged? We will
examine current challenges to global order and its governance in the
areas of multilateral security, international trade, environment
protection, etc. and look into the alternative proposals that are
put forward.
--How can world order
transformations be achieved peacefully? We will analyze the
politics of institutional reform of existing international
organizations in the realms of security (United Nations Security
Council), economics (IMF, World Bank, WTO, G20) and others.
The research program, through several arenas,
including joint conferences, joint publications, individual
publications, post-doctoral and graduate student training, and a
visiting scholar program, will seek to address these increasingly
important questions. The multi-year, multi-institution project will
specifically seek to understand the emerging power transition
phenomenon via two critical axes and four components. The axes are:
1) Rising Powers and the Global Order; and 2) Global Governance.
Within these broad axes, team members will, according to their
expertise, lead research on projects dealing with specific issue
concerns.
Four projects are specifically envisaged on
the following themes that fall within the two axes:
1. Is Peaceful Power Transitions Possible?
Will the rise of China and India be Peaceful? Paul will
lead this project, with Ripsman as co-leader, and Pouliot, Merand,
and Hall as collaborators. The project will explore two sets of
interrelated questions: One, it will ask whether the expectations of
conflict and war in existing theories of power transitions, which
focus so much on conflict and war, are still relevant in this era of
increasing globalization. Previous cases of violent transitions
following the two world wars and peaceful transitions involving the
US and UK and US and China will be explored. The second related
question will be the specific one of the potential consequences of
the rise of China and India, the two Asian giants. We will explore
whether the increasing trade relations, generated by globalization,
will temper their conflict behavior? What strategies are available
for the status accommodation of these states in a peaceful way, in
the Asian sub-system and the larger global system? Two volumes will
result from this project. To the first, Merand will contribute a
chapter, “Managing Imperial Decline: The Socio-Historical Evidence,”
with Hall and Ripsman writing chapters on the US-UK transition, and
on why Germany and Japan were not integrated or deterred in the
pre-WWII era, respectively. Pouliot will be contributing a chapter
on more contemporary developments entitled, "Can the Aspirations of
Rising Powers be Met through Institutional Reforms? The G20 and UN
Security Council Compared." For the second volume, Pouliot will be
writing a chapter, "Russia as an East Asian Power and its Impact on
Sino-Indian Relations"
2. Declining Powers and Power Transitions:
While globalization may have permitted the rise of new powers,
it has also precipitated or accelerated the decline of old ones, the
most prominent case being that of Europe, but also Japan and the US.
This project, led by Merand, with Paul as co-leader, and Hall,
Ripsman, and Pouliot serving as collaborators, will seek to
understand how such powers react to their own decline, and map out
the strategies adopted by European countries, Japan and the US to
stave off, deny or combat a widely perceived sense of geopolitical
decline vis-à-vis rising powers. Particular attention will be paid
to the question of whether the West’s decline is a product
of globalization or simply a return to a normal, pre-imperial
situation. Pouliot will contribute a paper to this project about
NATO’s new strategy of adaptation to economic hard times—titled
"NATO's 'Smart Defense': Negotiating the Alliance's Transformation
and Decline," while Hall will write on the “The Rise and Fall of
Empires in Historical Sociology,” and Ripsman on "Neoclassical
Realist Interpretations of Major Power Decline."
3. Nationalism and Peaceful Transitions?
John A. Hall will lead a conference exploring the possibility
and obstacles to peaceful transition posed by the specific
phenomenon of nationalism, which the historical record
shows has often made power transitions difficult. Merand will be
co-leader of this group, with Paul and Ripsman as collaborators. The
nationalism of rising powers, classically of Germany and Japan, will
be investigated in particular, as will that of their leaders, as
well as that of excluded middle class people who disliked the
internationalism of their leaders, while wanting more status for
their own rising country. From a contemporary perspective the
project will study how students in a rapidly growing China are
increasingly embracing nationalism—vis-à-vis Japan and the US--and
curtailing the room for maneuver for their elite. Merand will be
contributing to the conference and the resulting published volume
with a paper titled, “Nationalism and the Future of Socialism: the
case of France.”
4. Precedents and Innovations in the
Shaping of Global Order. Pouliot will lead this project, with
Merand as co-leader, and Paul, Hall and Ripsman as collaborators,
which will address the fact that as international organizations and
institutions adapt to changing circumstances, including the rise of
emerging powers, they tend to build on existing practices and
experiment with new ones. The conference on this theme will look
into key sites of global transformation—the UN Security Council, the
WTO, the World Bank, and the G20—in order to understand the
political dynamics of stability and change. Contributors will
combine various theoretical perspectives in order to shed new light
on the mechanisms of path dependence and institutional
transformation, with an eye on the specific problematique of rising
powers. Merand will be looking at the case of “How Do European
Diplomats Manage their Decline in International Organizations?” as a
participant in this project.
Five major international conferences on
the themes listed above, five volumes, several single and
joint-authored books, articles, conference papers and policy reports
are the expected outcomes. Research support for faculty and students
at all three institutions, as well as post-doctoral and visiting
scholar fellowships will be offered. Visiting scholars and
post-doctoral fellows, some of whom will be prominent scholars from
the rising power countries, will spend time at McGill or UdM drawing
from the resources made available and develop their relevant
projects. Scholars and students from various Quebec and Canadian
universities will also be invited. The members of the team will act
as paper-givers and discussants, and crucially as mentors for the
young scholars and post-docs who will be visiting Montreal. Other
scholars and institutions (detailed in table 2) will be invited to
contribute to the project according to the specific topics and
expertise required. Scholars from American University, the Graduate
Institute for International and Development Studies, the Norwegian
Institute for International Affairs, the University of Copenhagen,
Naval Postgraduate School, and Dartmouth College have already
expressed interest to join in this endeavor. Our goal through all of
this is to strengthen the already existing extensive international
networks of its members, develop new ones, and engage in
collaborative undertakings that will bring in global attention to
scholarship we are producing in Quebec on this issue. This exercise
will also support the building up of expertise and knowledge on
rising power such as China, Brazil and South Africa, something that
is currently lacking in Quebec. We will invite representatives from
the policy world, especially US Department of State, Pentagon, and
Canadian Foreign Affairs and Defense as well as Quebec officials
dealing with foreign affairs to our conferences to act as
discussants whenever possible. In terms of reaching out to policy
makers, Pouliot and Meranad will be organizing an SSHRC-funded
policy workshop with Canadian and foreign diplomats in 2014-2015, on
the topic: “Managing Geopolitical Decline.” Paul will continue
participate in track two meetings involving representatives from the
US and BRICS countries where he will present findings from this
project.
Visiting Scholars
2015-16
Patrick James
(University of Southern California)
Anders Wivel (University of Copenhagen)
2014-15
Zoltan Buzas (Drexel University)
C. Uday Bhaskar (Society for
Policy Studies, New Delhi)
Shibashis
Chatterjee (Jadavpur University)
Robert Partman (University
of Otago)
2013-14
James Der Derian (The University of Sydney)
Alisher Faizullae (University of World Economy and Diplomacy)
Sean Kay
(Ohio Wesleyan University)
2012-13
Rebecca Adler-Nissen (University of Copenhagen)
Bridget Coggins (Dartmouth College)
Rajat Ganguly (Murdoch University)
Harsh V. Pant (King's College London)
Jeffrey Taliaferro (Tufts University)
2010-11
Benjamin Miller (University of Haifa)
Vidya Nadkarni (San Diego State University)
Post-doctoral fellow
Olivier Schmitt
An
FQRSC funded research project
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